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I. INTRODUCTION
IN this paper we discuss compatibility decisions and choices of location of two
competing hardware suppliers in the presence of network eects, i.e. taking into
account that a user's surplus from hardware-software systems and from commu-
nications systems positively depends on the total number of users of compatible
systems. Whereas the working of these network eects is obvious in the case of
communication systems such as facsimile systems and e-mail systems, they arise
indirectly in the case of hardware-software systems such as VCR systems, CD sys-
tems, and videogame systems. There, usually, software components (pre-played
video tapes, CDs and video games) are produced with high xed costs and low
constant marginal costs, so that a rise in the total demand for compatible systems
increases the variety of software, which in turn increases the surplus of each user.
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In the following, we restrict ourselves to analyzing those cases in which a move to
compatibility requires the consent of both suppliers. The order of the decisions on
(in)compatibility and locations is treated as an endogenous variable; i.e, we will
derive the prot-maximizing sequence of these commitments. In the last stage of
the game, the duopolists compete in prices, and uniformly distributed consumers
form their expectations concerning prospective network sizes and each buy one unit
of hardware.
The paper presents three new results. First, we will show that suppliers do not
always opt for compatibility and dierentiated variants, but that there is the pos-
sibility that they maintain incompatibility and locate their variants at the center
of the consumer distribution. Then, a standards war takes place. Whether this is
possible depends on how expectations concerning future network sizes are formed.
If these expectations depend rst and foremost on prices, a standards war will never
happen, because then the suppliers would be forced to set prices equal to marginal
cost in order to have a chance of winning. However, when price commitments are not
feasible and switching costs are signicant, network-size expectations also depend
on factors such as small rst-mover advantages and successful marketing campaigns;
i.e., they can be more or less `stubborn' (with regard to prices). Then, the supplier
who is favored by expectations can skim o parts of the network-eect rent, so that
it might be protable to wage a standards war. Our second main result concerns the
prot-maximizing order of (in)compatibility and product-design commitments. We
1
See Church and Gandal [1992] for a model which discusses the emergence of network eects.
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will show that for a medium range of the general signicance of the network eects,
suppliers will commit themselves to compatibility before xing locations whenever
such an ex-ante commitment to compatibility is feasible, whereas otherwise, they
will be involved in a standards war. Here, a commitment to compatibility becomes
more attractive for suppliers when it can be done before product designs are xed.
Finally, considering total welfare, we will conrm the intuition that a social planner
who can intervene both in the compatibility decisions and in the choices of location
would always enforce compatibility. This result, however, cannot serve as a bench-
mark for policy recommendations because the idea of interventions in the horizontal
dierentiation is, obviously, unrealistic. Therefore, we use that welfare level as a
benchmark which results when the social planner can intervene only in the compati-
bility decisions. It turns out that against the background of this second-best welfare
optimum, standards wars are always welfare superior to compatibility.
As for the case of duopolistic Nash equilibria, our analysis builds on Anderson,
Goeree and Ramer [1997] and on Baake [1995]. The former showed that without
network eects, duopolists dierentiate their variants excessively. We will see that
given compatibility, they choose the same locations as in the absence of network
eects. Moreover, Baake proved that this result also holds when incompatibility is
given.
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As for the case of standards wars, our central assumptions with regard to
network-size expectations formation draw on Farrell and Katz [1998].
Our paper is organized as follows: after the main assumptions have been pre-
sented in Section II, we discuss price competition, expectations formation, and de-
mand for given locations and given (in)compatibility in Section III. In Section IV,
we present our basic game where it is assumed that the suppliers can commit them-
selves to compatibility only before they choose their locations. Then, in Section V,
we compare the results of this basic game with those of a game with the reverse ex-
ogenous order of commitments; from this comparison, it is straightforward to deduce
the prot-maximizing order of compatibility and product design decisions. Finally,
in Section VI, we present our welfare analysis and derive policy recommendations.
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The pioneering work in the analysis of compatibility decisions in the presence of network eects
is Katz and Shapiro [1985] where the case of homogeneous network-eect goods is discussed. For an
analysis of compatibility decisions within a Hotelling model but with exogenously given locations,
see Farrell and Saloner [1992] and Woeckener [1999a]. The case of a vertical product dierentiation
is examined in Baake and Boom [1997].
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II. THE MODEL
We consider a model with two single-product suppliers, S1 and S2, who produce
two substitutive variants of the central hardware component of a hardware-software
system or of a communications system, V1 and V2, and sell them at prices p
j
(j = 1; 2). We do not impose any a-priori restrictions on the suppliers' decisions
on product design, i.e., they can locate their variants anywhere on the real line.
Whereas formerly, the design of hardware components was dominated by the cri-
terion of technical functionalism, it is nowadays increasingly subject of strategic
considerations concerning horizontal and vertical product dierentiation. A clear
example for a horizontal dierentiation is the size of home audio systems. Here,
systems of the same quality are oered in a high number of variants which primarily
dier in size. More recent examples are the iMac and the vast dierentiation of
cellular telephones of a given quality. In the following, when the suppliers choose
dierent locations, the variant to the left is called V1, and its address is d
1
2 R.
With d
2
2 R as the address of V2 (and d
2
> d
1
), the distance between both vari-
ants, i.e. the extent of horizontal product dierentiation, amounts to d
2
  d
1
. We
assume constant and equal marginal costs as well as equal xed costs and normalize
both to zero. Moreover, it is assumed that compatibility can only be established
if both suppliers opt for it. This may be due to the fact that intellectual prop-
erty rights are attached to the interface specications or that product specications
of the competitor's variant which are necessary for establishing compatibility are
unknown. The suppliers can credibly commit themselves to compatibility via an
enforceable compatibility contract. In the basic version of our game, they can es-
tablish compatibility only before they choose their locations; in the second version,
they can establish compatibility only after choice of locations; and nally, in the
third version, the suppliers can choose whether they decide on (in)compatibility
before committing themselves to locations or afterwards. Compatibility causes no
extra costs irrespective of whether it is agreed upon before or after product designs
are xed.
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As, typically, a hardware variant's inherent product characteristics and the size
of its network are poor substitutes, we specify the consumers' surplus as additive in
the general willingness to pay for the variant, on the one hand, and that part of the
3
This assumption is made in order to highlight the strategic reason behind a commitment to
compatibility in general and behind the prot-maximizing timing of a commitment to compatibility
in the third version of the game.
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willingness to pay which is due to the network eects (the `network-eect rent'), on
the other hand. With regard to the consumers' general willingness to pay, we assume
that it is uniformly distributed along the unit intervall ]  0:5; 0:5[. Moreover, it is
assumed that the alienation terms (`transportation costs') are quadratic with respect
to distance, i.e. that preferences are convex. With b > 0 as the basic willingness to
pay for a variant, t > 0 as a measure of the heterogenity of consumers' preferences,
and  0:5  i  0:5 as a consumer's address, this general willingness to pay for
variant Vj can be formulated as b t(i d
j
)
2
. Considering the part of the willingness
to pay which is due to the network eects, we assume that it is linear in network
size, and that consumers do not dier in their valuation of network size. Let n
be the measure of the general signicance of the network eects, and let x
j
be the
demand for Vj, i.e., for given incompatibility, its network size. Then, in the case of
incompatibility, the surplus of a consumer with address i when using variant Vj is
s
ij
= b  t(i  d
j
)
2
+ nx
j
  p
j
:(1)
We assume that a suciently high basic willingness to pay b guarantees that each
consumer buys one (and only one) unit of hardware. Moreover, it is assumed that
the constant consumer density amounts to one, so that the total mass of consumers is
normalized to one. Then, the absolute demand for a variant (its network size under
incompatibility) equals its market share, and x
2
= 1 x
1
holds. Under compatibility,
the variants have a joint network of size one, i.e. s
ij
= b  t(i  d
j
)
2
+ n  p
j
holds.
III. PRICE COMPETITION, EXPECTATIONS FORMATION, AND DEMAND
In this section, we derive the Nash equilibria of the last stage of the game, i.e. for
given locations and given (in)compatibility. In the case of given compatibility, the
formation of network-size expectations is trivial; then, all consumers will be in a joint
network of size one, and everybody knows this fact. In the case of given incompati-
bility, we restrict ourselves to analyzing Nash equilibria with fullled expectations.
The Case of Given Compatibility
As consumers are uniformly distributed along the unit interval ]  0:5; 0:5[ with
a density of one, the demand for variant Vj amounts to x
j
= 0:5 { where { is the
4
address of those consumers who are indierent between the two variants.
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Hence,
the demand functions can be derived from the condition s
i1
= s
i2
. Taking into
account that 0  x
j
 1 holds, we obtain
x
j
=
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
0 if p
j
 p
k
+ t(d
2
  d
1
)[1 (d
1
+ d
2
)]
1 if p
j
 p
k
  t(d
2
  d
1
)[1 (d
1
+ d
2
)]
0:5 +
p
k
  p
j
2t(d
2
  d
1
)

d
1
+ d
2
2
otherwise
(2)
with j; k = 1; 2 and j 6= k. Obviously, the price elasticity of demand is higher (in
absolute terms) the lower the extent of product dierentiation d
2
 d
1
is which results
from the suppliers' decisions on locations. Note that d
1
+ d
2
> 0 (< 0) means that
V1 (V2) has a location advantage, because then V1 (V2) is located closer to the
center i = 0 than V2 (V1), so that its average distance to consumers is lower. In the
following, we assume without loss of generality that d
1
+d
2
 0 holds, i.e. if a location
advantage exists, it is an advantage of V1.
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With given compatibility, the existence
of network eects only leads to a higher address-independent part of the willingnesses
to pay (b + n instead of b for both variants). Obviously, such an increase by the
same amount cannot aect the competition between the variants. Thus, equilibrium
prices and prots are the same as in the Hotelling model without network eects.
Maximizing 
j
= p
j
x
j
with x
j
according to Equation (2) with respect to p
j
leads
via the best-response functions p
j
= 0:5fp
k
+ t(d
2
  d
1
)[1 (d
1
+ d
2
)]g to
6
p
c;`
j
= t(d
2
  d
1
)
 
1
d
1
+ d
2
3
!
;(3)
where c denotes given compatibility and ` denotes given locations. Substituting the
price dierence p
c;`
k
  p
c;`
j
into Equation (2) leads to
x
c;`
j
= 0:5
d
1
+ d
2
6
;(4)
4
In the following,  and  means that the upper sign holds for supplier S1 and the lower sign
for supplier S2.
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Then, for d
1
+ d
2
> 0, there are two cases: either V1 lies to the left and V2 to the right of
the center and  d
1
< d
2
holds, or both variants lie to the right of the center and d
1
< d
2
holds.
Of course, the natural candidates for an equilibrium of our symmetric model are locations which
are symmetric relative to the center, so that d
1
+ d
2
= 0 holds (i.e.  d
1
= d
2
with d
2
> 0 for
dierentiated variants and d
j
= 0 for homogeneous variants).
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The second-order condition reads  1=[t(d
2
  d
1
)] < 0, and this is always fullled.
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and by multiplication with equilibrium prices, we obtain equilibrium prots as

c;`
j
= 0:5t(d
2
  d
1
)
 
1
d
1
+ d
2
3
!
2
:(5)
From Equations (3) and (4), it becomes clear that if S1 could gain a location ad-
vantage, he would subsequently have both the higher price and the higher market
share. Hence, it would appear that S2 will never accept such a disadvantage, so
that we can presume that only Nash equilibria which are symmetric in locations
will be of relevance in the overall game.
7
From Equation (3), it also becomes clear
that the existence of a Nash equilibrium requires d
1
+ d
2
< 3 to hold. This can be
taken for granted, because otherwise S2 could always realize strictly positive prots
by re-locating his variant into the support of the consumer distribution.
The Case of Given Incompatibility
For given incompatibility, there are two basic cases; while in the case of a dom-
inating product dierentiation d
2
  d
1
> n=t, both variants have positive market
shares, dominating network eects d
2
  d
1
< n=t turn the market into a natural
monopoly.
 In the case of a dominating product dierentiation d
2
 d
1
> n=t, equating s
i1
with
s
i2
, assuming fullled expectations and using x
j
= 0:5 { results in
x
j
=
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
0 if p
j
 p
k
+ t(d
2
  d
1
)[1 (d
1
+ d
2
)]  n
1 if p
j
 p
k
  t(d
2
  d
1
)[1 (d
1
+ d
2
)] + n
0:5 +
p
k
  p
j
 t(d
2
  d
1
)(d
1
+ d
2
)
2[ t(d
2
  d
1
)  n ]
otherwise :
(6)
By comparing the denominators, it becomes clear that the price elasticity of demand
is higher under incompatibility than under compatibility. This is due to bandwagon
eects, which are induced by the network eects whenever systems are incompatible.
Hence, price competition is more intensive under incompatibility, so that duopoly
prices and prots are lower than in the case of given compatibility. It is straightfor-
ward to prove the following lemma:
7
However, we need the general formulas for some out-of-equilibrium considerations later on.
6
Lemma 1a. With given locations and given incompatibility (in), a dominating prod-
uct dierentiation d
2
  d
1
> n=t leads to an incompatible duopoly with equilibrium
prices, market shares, and individual prots
p
in;`
j
= t(d
2
  d
1
)
 
1
d
1
+ d
2
3
!
  n ;(7)
x
in;`
j
= 0:5
t(d
2
  d
1
)(d
1
+ d
2
)
6[ t(d
2
  d
1
)  n ]
=
p
in;`
j
2[ t(d
2
  d
1
)  n ]
and(8)

in;`
j
=
"
t(d
2
  d
1
)
 
1
d
1
+ d
2
3
!
  n
#
2
2[ t(d
2
  d
1
)  n ]
;(9)
respectively.
Proof. Maximizing 
j
= p
j
x
j
with x
j
according to Equation (6) with respect to p
j
leads via the best-response functions p
j
= 0:5fp
k
+ t(d
2
  d
1
)[1  (d
1
+ d
2
)]   ng
to equilibrium prices according to Equation (7). The second-order condition reads
 1=[t(d
2
  d
1
)  n] < 0, and this is (only) fullled when the product dierentiation
dominates. Substituting p
in;`
k
  p
in;`
j
into Equation (6) leads to equilibrium market
shares, and subsequent multiplication results in equilibrium prots. The existence
of a duopolistic Nash equilibrium requires (d
2
  d
1
)[1  (d
1
+ d
2
)=3] > n=t to hold.
Insofar as d
2
  d
1
> n=t holds, this (again) can be taken for granted, because oth-
erwise S2 could always realize strictly positive prots by re-locating his variant. 2
As in the case of given compatibility, we can presume that only Nash equilibria with
d
1
+ d
2
= 0 are of relevance in the overall game.
 In the case of dominating network eects d
2
  d
1
< n=t, the inner branch of
Equation (6) is upward sloping and irrelevant because there, the second-order con-
dition of prot maximization is not fullled (see the above proof). In this case,
the relatively high general signicance of the network eects turns the market into
a natural monopoly. Given fullled expectations, only x
1
= 1 and x
1
= 0 can be
(stable) Nash equilibria.
8
As this is (assumed to be) common knowledge, the only
locations of relevance are
d
in;
j
= 0 :(10)
8
With symmetric locations, the splitting of consumers into two networks (x
j
= 0:5) is an equi-
librium with fullled expectations, too; but it is unstable under restricted best-response dynamics.
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Any other location can be ruled out a priori, because not locating one's variant
at the center of the consumer distribution means accepting a product disadvan-
tage and, thus, oering the competitor the opportunity of monopolizing the market
via limit pricing. Hence, given incompatibility and dominating network eects, a
standards war between homogeneous variants occurs. Whether the suppliers wage
such a standards war when they have the alternative of establishing compatibility
decisively depends on the process of expectations formation.
9
With regard to this
process (and with homogeneous variants), the conventional hypothesis probably is
that network-size expectations exclusively depend on prices. In this case, suppliers
would be forced to set prices equal to marginal costs in order to have a chance
of winning. Then, obviously, given the alternative of a move to compatibility, the
suppliers will never wage a standards war. This hypothesis, however, ignores the
fact that in reality, a standards war is a dynamic process where price commitments
are rare and the switch to a competing system usually leads to considerable tangi-
ble and intangible switching costs. Taking into account this fact, it seems obvious
that in the case of a standards war, network-size expectations can be more or less
stubborn (with regard to prices) and are inuenced by a lot of other factors such
as marketing eorts and product preannouncements. In the following, these factors
are modelled as exogenous shocks which come into play in stage three, i.e. when
(in)compatibility and locations are xed. Whereas these shocks cancel out during a
duopolistic competition, they are decisive for the outcome of a standards war. This
is due to the fact that in the latter case (and given that a price commitment is not
feasible), an exogenous shock can break the symmetry (in locations) and make one
of the two pareto-equivalent equilibria focal.
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We assume, for example, that dur-
ing the market introduction one of the suppliers can achieve a small (but decisive)
rst-mover advantage or that he can convince consumers that important software
producers will develop software only for his variant. Moreover, we assume that a
priori nothing can be said about which supplier will be the lucky one who gets the
decisive lead. Therefore, when a supplier opts for a standards war, he knows that
he has a fty-per-cent chance of winning.
The most important implication of the fact that expectations are not inuenced by
prices alone is that the supplier of the (more or less stubbornly) favored variant
9
For the following, see Farrell and Katz [1998], pp. 616.
10
As for the duopoly case (where Nash equilibria are always unique), note that it would be more
precise to denote the equilibrium values as expected values. However, in order to avoid notational
clutter, we have refrained from doing so.
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can skim o parts of the network-eect rent. This is due to the fact that then an
expected advantage in network size is equivalent to a quality advantage and enables
the supplier who is favored by (more or less) stubborn expectations to monopolize
the market with a strictly positive limit price. A clear example is the case of totally
stubborn expectations. Assume, for example, that during the market introduction
supplier S2 initially is so unlucky with getting software support that everybody
is convinced that his competitor will be the winner. Then, consumers compare
s
i1
= b  t(i  d
1
)
2
+n  p
1
with s
i2
= b  t(i  d
2
)
2
  p
2
, so that S1 can monopolize
the market via a limit price of n. In reality, how much of the network-eect rent
n the winner can appropriate depends on the concrete circumstances. For the fol-
lowing, we assume that he can set a limit price of qn where q is a random variable
which is uniformly distributed along the unit interval ]0; 1[ and reects the degree
of stubborness of expectations. Hence, the prots which a supplier expects given
that he will be the winner amount to 0:5n, whereas the prots which a supplier can
a priori expect when he wages a standards war amount to 0:25n. In the following,
the former are denoted as 
in;;e
j
and the latter as 
in;;exp
j
. To sum up, we can state
Lemma 1b. With given incompatibility, dominating network eects lead to a stan-
dards war with (a priori) expected individual prots of

in;;exp
j
= 0:25n :(11)
In Lemma 1b, we have anticipated that given a natural monopoly, always d
j
= 0
holds. However, in order to examine for which parameter constellations a standards
war is a Nash equilibrium of the overall game later on, we have to make an as-
sumption about what will happen in the case of a location advantage of supplier S1.
Here, there are two cases; with a signicant product advantage, x
1
= 1 is the unique
equilibrium, whereas with a small product advantage, x
1
= 0 is an equilibrium,
too. As for the latter case, it seems natural to assume that a product advantage
has a dominating inuence on expectations so that S1 is the winner with certainty
(given that he sets a limit price), because we see product-design decisions as credible
commitments. This assumption is supported by the fact that in this case, x
1
= 1
is the pareto-superior equilibrium (cumulated alienation eects are lower than in
x
1
= 0).
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From the surplus equations, we obtain the limit price and the expected
11
Moreover, note that the importance of the exogenous shocks in symmetric cases (and when
a credible price commitment is not feasible) stems from the fact that consumers use them as a
9
prots of the supplier with the product advantage as

in;`;e
1
= 0:5n + t(d
2
  d
1
)(d
1
+ d
2
  1) :(12)
IV. COMPATIBILITY DECISION BEFORE CHOICE OF LOCATION
In this section, we assume that suppliers can establish compatibility only before
they noncooperatively and simultaneously choose their locations. If compatibility is
not established, this is a commitment to incompatibility. The analysis in this section
is not only a preliminary step for the derivation of the prot-maximizing order of the
decisions on (in)compatibility and product design in Section V but, in addition, it is
for some markets of direct relevance. In the case of home entertainment systems such
as VCR systems, CD systems, and videogame systems, for example, compatibility
cannot be achieved with reasonable costs once the hardware components have been
designed, i.e. by means of an adapter or converter. This is due to the fact that in
these cases, even small dierences in the chosen technology lead to interfaces which
are too variant-specic.
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Choice of Location with Given Compatibility
From the standard Hotelling model, it is well known that there are two opposing
eects of location on individual prots. On the one hand, for given prices, a move
towards the center results in higher prots because it reduces the average distance
to consumers. On the other hand, such a move leads to more intensive price com-
petition, lowering prots. Anderson, Goeree and Ramer [1997] showed that without
network eects, these two eects are of equal amount for d
1
=  0:75 and d
2
= 0:75
(see p. 125). These prot-maximizing locations are outside the support of the con-
sumer distribution. In the case of compatibility, this result holds in the presence of
coordination device, whereas with asymmetric locations, the product advantage is a by far more
reliable coordination device. Of course, there might be cases where a big shock overcompensates
a small product advantage. Nevertheless, in the sequel, we do not allow for this case. Allowing
for it would only change the concrete value of the borderline between duopolistic Nash equilibria
and standards wars (see the second step of the proof of Lemma 2 and the rst step of the proof of
Lemma 3).
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The competition between VHS and Betamax VCR systems as well as the competition between
Nintendo 64 and Sony's Playstation are clear examples.
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network eects. Dierentiating prots according to Equation (5) with respect to d
j
leads to the best-response functions d
j
= d
k
=3  1, and these have a unique point
of intersection:
13
d
c;
j
= 0:75 :(13)
Substituting this result into Equations (3) to (5), we obtain x
c;
j
= 0:5 and

c;
j
= 0:5p
c;
j
= 0:75t :(14)
As for realized welfare, the individual equilibrium surplus from Vj amounts to b  
t(i0:75)
2
+n 1:5t. Via integration, we obtain the cumulated equilibrium surplus
as
S
c;
= b+ n 
85t
48
:(15)
Finally, adding equilibrium prots results in a total realized welfare of
W
c;
= b + n 
13t
48
:(16)
Choice of Location with Given Incompatibility
As for the case of given incompatibility, we have seen in the previous section that
the location decisions of suppliers determine whether the market is a duopoly or a
natural monopoly. Baake [1995] showed that given a duopoly, the prot-maximizing
locations are the same as under compatibility (pp. 9f). Moreover, we know that given
a natural monopoly, the suppliers are forced to locate their variants at the center of
the consumer distribution in order to prevent exclusion. The main question is under
what circumstances the suppliers get involved in a standards war and under what
circumstances they dierentiate their variants so strongly that they can coexist. We
can prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Given that the suppliers have maintained incompatibility in the rst
stage of the game,
 they dierentiate their variants strongly in the case of n=t < 0:6875; then
d
in;
j
= 0:75(17)
holds. This leads to a duopoly with x
in;
j
= 0:5 and

in;
j
= 0:5p
in;
j
= 0:75t  0:5n :(18)
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The second-order conditions read  (t=9)[6(3d
j
+d
k
)] < 0, and this is fullled for d
j
= 0:75.
11
 they locate their variants at the center of the consumer distribution in the case of
n=t > 0:6875; i.e. then d
in;
j
= 0 holds, and a standards war with expected prots
according to Equation (11) takes place.
The proof consists of three steps. In the rst step, we give a more direct proof of
Equation (17) than is given in Baake [1995]. In the second step, we show that this
strong product dierentiation is a Nash equilibrium for n=t < 0:6875. Finally, the
third step proves that locating the variants at the center is a Nash equilibrium for
n=t > 0:34. Hence, for 0:34 < n=t < 0:6875, both Nash equilibria coexist. In this
case, it seems natural to assume that the Nash equilibrium which leads to higher
prots is focal. Comparing duopoly prots according to Equation (18) with the prof-
its a supplier expects from a standards war (0:25n), it is obvious that the duopoly
equilibrium is always focal.
Proof. (a) Dierentiating Equation (9) with respect to d
j
leads to the rst-order
conditions
@
in;`
j
@d
j
= t
 
1
2d
j
3
!
x
in;`
j
+ p
in;`
j
 2td
j
[ t(d
2
  d
1
)  n ] + t
2
(d
2
2
  d
2
1
)
6[ t(d
2
  d
1
)  n ]
2
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Taking into account that @x
in;`
2
=@d
2
=  @x
in;`
1
=@d
2
as well as p
in;`
j
= 2[t(d
2
  d
1
) 
n]x
in;`
j
hold, we can formulate these conditions as
@
in;`
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@d
j
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2d
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!
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in;`
j
 2[ t(d
2
  d
1
)  n ] x
in;`
j
@x
in;`
1
@d
j
= 0 :
Dividing by x
in;`
j
and using @x
in;`
1
=@d
1
= @x
in;`
1
=@d
2
, it becomes clear that there is a
unique solution with @p
in;`
1
=@d
1
= @p
in;`
2
=@d
2
, i.e. with  d
1
= d
2
. Substituting this
back into the rst-order conditions leads to d
j
= 0:75. Evaluated at this point, the
second-order conditions reduce to  2t(1:5t  n) < 0. This is always fullled insofar
as the product dierentiation dominates. Finally, substituting d
j
= 0:75 into the
prot function (9) leads to Equation (18).
(b) In this step, let us assume that initially, the variants are located at d
1
=  0:75
and d
2
= 0:75, respectively, and that one of the two suppliers, say S1, can deviate
from his location in order to monopolize the market. Maximizing his expected
monopoly prots according to Equation (12) with respect to d
1
(for given d
2
= 0:75)
leads to d
1
= 0:5; i.e., S1 would locate his variant at the right boundary of the
consumer distribution. Then, his expected prots would amount to 0:5n+ 0:0625t.
Comparing these prots with the duopoly prots of 0:75t   0:5n makes clear that
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a deviation from d
1
=  0:75 in order to monopolize the market pays o for n=t >
0:6875, whereas for n=t < 0:6875, choosing d
j
= 0:75 is a Nash equilibrium.
(c) In this step, let us assume that initially, the variants are located at d
j
= 0, and
that one of the two suppliers, say S2, can deviate from there in order to prevent a
standards war. From Equation (9), we obtain the prot-maximizing location
d
2
= 0:5 +
2n
3t
+
s

0:5 +
2n
3t

2
 
n
t
:
Here, for n=t < 0:75, the discriminant is always positive and @d
2
=@n > 0 holds (for
n=t > 0:75, duopoly prots cannot be positive). A numerical evaluation of Equation
(9) with d
1
= 0 and d
2
as noted above makes clear that deviating in order to prevent
a standards war pays o for n=t < 0:34. Hence, for n=t > 0:34, waging a standards
war is a Nash equilibrium. (However, as shown above, it is neither unique nor focal
for n=t < 0:6875.) 2
Considering realized welfare, the calculation of total welfare is straightforward in the
case of a duopoly; it consists of the cumulated basic willingness to pay b, cumulated
network eects of 0:5n, and the cumulated alienation eects. The latter are equal
to those under compatibility, i.e. they amount to  13t=48. Hence, we obtain
W
in;
= b + 0:5n 
13t
48
:(19)
Substracting total prots of 1:5t  n results in a cumulated consumers' surplus of
S
in;
= b + 1:5n 
85t
48
:(20)
In the case of a standards war, cumulated alienation eects amount to  2t
R
0:5
0
i
2
di =
 t=12; i.e., they are lower (in absolute terms) than in a duopoly. Moreover, now
the cumulated network eects amount to n, so that we obtain
W
in;
= b + n 
t
12
:(21)
The distribution of the network-eect rent n depends on the realization of the ran-
dom variable q; the expected value of the monopoly prot reads 
in;;e
j
= 0:5n (with
j = 1 or j = 2) and, thus, we obtain for the expected value of consumers' surplus
S
in;;e
= b + 0:5n 
t
12
:(22)
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Compatibility Decision
The decision on (in)compatibility is made by comparing prots under com-
patibility 
c;
j
= 0:75t (Equation [14]) with prots under incompatibility 
in;
j
=
0:75t   0:5n (Equation [18]) for n=t < 0:6875 and with the expected prots of a
standards war 
in;;exp
j
= 0:25n (Equation [11]) for n=t > 0:6875. For n=t < 0:6875,
the decision on (in)compatibility is a decision on whether to compete within a com-
patible duopoly or within an incompatible duopoly (both with d
j
= 0:75). Ob-
viously, the former is always prot maximizing. For n=t > 0:6875, the decision on
(in)compatibility is a decision on whether to compete within a compatible duopoly
(with d
j
= 0:75) or for the market (with d
j
= 0). Here, the former is prot max-
imizing for n=t < 3, whereas the latter leads to higher expected prots whenever
the general signicance of the network eects is (relatively) high, i.e. for n=t > 3.
Thus, for n=t < 3, prots, consumers' surplus, and total welfare are according to
Equations (14) to (16), whereas in the case of a high general signicance of the
network eects, expected prots, total welfare, and expected consumers' surplus are
according to Equations (11), (21), and (22), respectively. Hence, to sum up, we can
state:
Proposition 1. Given that the suppliers can commit themselves to compatibility
only before they choose their locations,
 they establish compatibility whenever the general signicance of the network
eects is not high (n=t < 3). Then, they dierentiate their variants strongly
(d
;
j
= 0:75), and this leads to a symmetric compatible duopoly with individ-
ual prots 
;
j
= 0:75t, consumers' surplus S
;
= b+ n  85t=48, and total welfare
W
;
= b + n  13t=48.
 they maintain incompatibility whenever the general signicance of the network ef-
fects is high (n=t > 3). Then, they locate their variants at the center (d
;
j
= 0), i.e. a
standards war takes place with expected individual prots 
;;exp
j
= 0:25n, expected
consumers' surplus S
;;e
= b+ 0:5n  t=12, and total welfare W
;
= b + n  t=12.
For n=t < 0:6875, compatibility leads to higher prots because the price elasticity of
demand is higher in an incompatible duopoly than in a compatible duopoly, so that
the move to compatibility softens price competition and results in higher prices. For
0:6875 < n=t < 3, the duopoly price under compatibility amounts to 1:5t and, thus,
is always higher than the expected limit price in a standards war (which amounts
to 0:5n). In a standards war, the monopolist has double the market share than in
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a duopoly, but this is oset by the uncertainty about who will be the monopolist.
Hence, in the decision on whether to compete within a compatible duopoly or wage
a standards war, only prices matter, so that n=t < 3 leads to the former and n=t > 3
to the latter.
As for total welfare, with n=t < 0:6875, the move to compatibility has the advantage
of realizing additional network eects, whereas for n=t > 0:6875, consumers are in a
joint network both under compatibility and under incompatibility. Moreover, in the
case of a standards war, cumulated alienation eects are lower (in absolute terms)
than under compatibility due to the fact that the monopolist locates his variant at
the center. Hence, realized welfare is always higher in a standards war.
Consumers (as a whole) always suer from the move to compatibility for n=t < 3
and almost always suer from the monopolization for n=t > 3. With regard to the
case of n=t < 0:6875, comparing cumulated consumers' surplus under compatibil-
ity (Equation [15]) with cumulated consumers' surplus in an incompatible duopoly
(Equation [20]) makes clear that the compatibility advantage of having a joint net-
work is overcompensated by higher prices. For 0:6875 < n=t < 3, compatibility
has no network-size advantage but both the disadvantage of a price which is higher
than the expected value of the limit price in a standards war and the disadvantage
of higher cumulated alienation eects. Finally, for n=t > 3, the price under com-
patibility would be lower than the expected value of the limit price, but cumulated
alienation eects are lower (in absolute terms) in a standards war. Comparing S
c;
with S
in;;e
according to Equation (22) makes clear that compatibility would lead
to a higher cumulated consumers' surplus for n=t > 3:375. Hence, except for the
parameter range 3 < n=t < 3:375, the interests of suppliers and consumers (as a
whole) with regard to (in)compatibility are always conicting.
V. ENDOGENOUS ORDER OF THE DECISIONS
ON COMPATIBILITY AND LOCATIONS
In this section, we derive the prot-maximizing order of the commitments to
(in)compatibility and locations. In the rst subsection, we assume that suppliers
can commit themselves to compatibility only after they have chosen locations. Com-
paring the results of this game with those of the previous section, it is straightforward
to deduce the outcome of the game where suppliers can choose whether they decide
on (in)compatibility before or after they choose locations (in the second subsection).
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Compatibility Decision after Choice of Location
Obviously, the fact that d
j
= 0:75 are the optimal locations for given com-
patibility and that either d
j
= 0:75 or d
j
= 0 are the optimal locations for given
incompatibility is independent of the sequence of decisions. Moreover, we have
seen that for d
j
= 0:75, compatibility leads to higher prots than incompatibility.
Hence, as for the second stage of this game, if suppliers have chosen d
j
= 0:75
in the rst stage, they opt for compatibility, whereas if they have chosen d
j
= 0 in
the rst stage, they maintain incompatibility.
14
However, as becomes clear from the
analysis of the rst stage, the borderline between the parameter regimes of these two
cases is aected by the order of commitments. We can prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Given that the suppliers can commit themselves to compatibility only
after they have chosen their locations,
 they dierentiate their variants strongly (d
;
j
= 0:75) and establish compatibil-
ity for n=t < 1:375, i.e. whenever the general signicance of the network eects is
(relatively) low. In this case, a symmetric compatible duopoly comes about with
individual prots, consumers' surplus, and total welfare as stated in the rst part
of Proposition 1.
 they locate their variants at the center (d
;
j
= 0) and maintain incompatibility
for n=t > 1:375. This is the case of a standards war with expected individual prof-
its, expected consumers' surplus, and total welfare as stated in the second part of
Proposition 1.
The proof consists of two steps which are analogous to the second and third step of
the proof of Lemma 2. In the rst step, we prove that choosing d
j
= 0:75 (and
subsequently opting for compatibility) is a Nash equilibrium whenever the general
signicance of the network eects is low, i.e. for n=t < 1:375. In the second step, it
is shown that locating the variants at the center of the consumer distribution (and
subsequently opting for incompatibility) is a Nash equilibrium for n=t > 0:

8. Thus,
for 0:

8 < n=t < 1:375, both kinds of equilibria coexist. Here, again, we assume that
the equilibrium is focal which leads to higher prots. Comparing duopoly prots
with the expected prots from a standards war, it is obvious that the duopoly equi-
librium is always focal.
14
In particular, they never opt for incompatibility in the second stage when they have chosen
d
j
= 0:75 in the rst stage. All asymmetric locations can be ruled out by analogous reasoning
as in the previous sections; see Woeckener [1999b] for a more detailed proof.
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Proof. (a) In this step, let us assume that initially, the variants are located at
d
1
=  0:75 and d
2
= 0:75, respectively, and that supplier S1 can deviate from his
location in order to monopolize the market. Maximizing expected monopoly prots
with respect to d
1
shows that if he deviated from d
1
=  0:75, S1 would locate
his variant at the right boundary of the consumer distribution and would expect
prots of 0:5n + 0:0625t: see Step (b) of the proof of Lemma 2. Now, however,
he compares these expected prots with prots in a compatible duopoly (0:75t).
Hence, a deviation from d
1
=  0:75 (and subsequent monopolization) pays o for
n=t > 1:375, whereas for a low general signicance of the network eects, choosing
d
j
= 0:75 is a Nash equilibrium.
(b) In this step, let us assume that initially, the variants are located at d
j
= 0,
and that S2 can deviate from there in order to enforce a duopoly. If he deviated,
he would always prefer a compatible to an incompatible duopoly because in the
latter case, both his price and his market share would be lower. This becomes clear
from comparing Equations (3) and (4) with Equations (7) and (8), respectively.
In case of deviating and enforcing a compatible duopoly, S2 would make prots of

c;`
2
= 0:5td
2
(1   d
2
=3)
2
(see Equation [5] with d
1
= 0). Maximizing these prots
with respect to d
2
shows that S2 would choose d
2
= 1 and would make prots of
0:

2t (instead of 
in;;exp
2
= 0:25n). Thus, deviating from the center and enforcing a
compatible duopoly pays o for n=t < 0:

8. It is straightforward to show that for this
parameter regime (and given d
1
= 0 and d
2
= 1), S1 would not block compatibility,
because prots under incompatibility would be lower (see Equations [5], [9], and
[12]). Hence, for n=t < 0:

8, S2 indeed deviates and enforces a compatible duopoly,
whereas for n=t > 0:

8, choosing d
j
= 0 (and subsequently opting for incompatibility
and waging a standards war) is a Nash equilibrium. (However, as shown above, it
is neither unique nor focal for n=t < 1:375.) 2
Compatibility Decision before or after Choice of Location
From Proposition 1 and Lemma 3, it becomes clear that the market outcome
does not depend on the sequence of commitments for n=t < 1:375 (in either case
compatibility and strong product dierentiation) and for n=t > 3 (in either case in-
compatibility and homogeneous variants). However, if the general signicance of the
network eects is neither low nor high, suppliers will establish compatibility when-
ever a commitment to compatibility is feasible only before the choice of location, but
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will maintain incompatibility and wage a standards war whenever a commitment to
compatibility is feasible only after the choice of location. In the latter case, they ex-
pect prots of 0:25n, whereas under compatibility, prots amount to 0:75t. Hence, if
the suppliers can decide on the order of commitments, they prefer to commit them-
selves to compatibility before the choice of location for 1:375 < n=t < 3 in order to
prevent a standards war. Obviously, if the general signicance of the network eects
is neither low nor high, the ability of suppliers to commit themselves to compati-
bility ex ante signicantly softens competition in locations. To sum up, we can state:
Proposition 2. If the general signicance of the network eects is neither low nor high
(1:375 < n=t < 3), the market outcome depends on the order of the commitments
on (in)compatibility and product design. Suppliers who can choose whether they
decide on (in)compatibility before they choose their locations or afterwards establish
compatibility before xing product designs and, in this way, prevent a standards war.
Or in other words: a commitment to compatibility becomes more attractive for sup-
pliers when it can be done before product designs are xed. Considering the general
robustness of the market outcomes towards more realistic consumer distributions, it
is straightforward to show that for symmetric unimodal densities on ]   0:5; 0:5[, a
standards war becomes more probable the more concentrated the consumer distribu-
tion is. Whereas expected prots from a standards war do not depend on the shape
of the consumer density function (but only on its width), prots under compatibility
are lower the higher the density is at its median i = 0 (see Anderson, Goeree and
Ramer [1997], p. 116).
VI. WELFARE ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A social planner who could eectively intervene in both the choices of locations
and the compatibility decisions would always enforce compatibility and locations
d
j
= 0:25, because the former maximizes cumulated network eects and the latter
minimizes cumulated alienation eects.
15
However, an intervention in the horizon-
tal dierentiation of hardware components is a quite unrealistic idea, and we are
not aware of any law or regulation that could enable such an intervention. Hence,
considering policy recommendations, this welfare-theoretical rst-best optimum is
15
As for price formation, there is no reason to intervene. Duopoly prices are of equal amount,
and this is { due to the symmetry of the model's set-up { welfare optimal.
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irrelevant. In order to derive practicable policy recommendations, we have to take
into consideration only interventions in the compatibility decisions.
16
That means
that we have to compare welfare in Nash equilibria for given compatibility with
welfare in Nash equilibria for given incompatibility and use the higher welfare as
a reasonable welfare-theoretical second-best standard. From Equations (16), (19),
and (21), it becomes clear that the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3. Compatibility is welfare superior to incompatibility only if the alter-
native is an incompatible duopoly, whereas a standards war always leads to a higher
welfare than compatibility.
This result is due to the fact that in a competition for the market, the monopolist
is forced to oer a variant which matches consumers' preferences as far as possible,
whereas a move to compatibility softens competition over product designs signif-
icantly. Hence, in particular policy recommendations concerning standards wars
depend on which welfare-theoretical benchmark is chosen. Whereas against the
background of the welfare-theoretical rst-best optimum, standards wars are always
a market failure, they are welfare optimal against the background of a reasonable
second-best welfare-theoretical benchmark. Note that the result stated in Propo-
sition 3 is of considerable robustness towards more general consumer distributions.
In particular, it holds for the triangular distribution and, thus, for all concave dis-
tributions.
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Whenever a standards war takes place, calls for an intervention in favor of com-
patibility are a very common reaction. A conventional policy recommendation is
the compulsory licensing of the intellectual property rights attached to the inter-
face specications. If the suppliers knew ex ante that the winner of the standards
war would be forced to disclose his interface specication and license the attached
intellectual property rights, they would have no reason to opt for a standards war.
Our analysis shows that such a policy recommendation can be misguided. If it is
deduced against the background of the fact that compatibility is always rst-best op-
16
In Europe, for example, compatibility arrangements can be prohibited based on Article 85
EEC Treaty, and compatibility can be enforced based on Article 86 EEC Treaty.
17
However, comparing cumulated alienation eects in a compatible duopoly with cumulated
alienation eects in a standards war, the dierence only amounts to t=64 in the case of the triangular
distribution, whereas it amounts to 12t=64 in the case of the uniform distribution. Hence, probably
Proposition 3 does not hold for (very) sharply peaked logconcave densities.
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timal, it is misguided because it does not take into account that under compatibility
the horizontal hardware dierentiation is excessive (and that this fact, realistically,
cannot be remedied by policy interventions). Of course, things might be dierent
if policy interventions do not aim at the maximization of total welfare but at the
maximization of expected consumers' surplus. In this case, calls for an intervention
in favor of compatibility are understandable insofar as the general signicance of the
network eects is high, because then consumers are almost always better o under
compatibility (see our analysis at the end of Section IV).
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